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FOREWORD 
The authors dedicate this book to David Goettee whose diligent attention to 
optimizing research effectiveness greatly improved the research results 
described here. 
Anhydrous ammonia (NH3) is widely used as a nitrogen fertilizer for crops. 
NH3 is a hazardous material that can cause chemical burns, frostbite, and 
suffocation. Nurse tanks are mobile steel pressure vessels that hold NH3 at 
multiple times the atmospheric pressure to maintain it as a liquid above its 
240K boiling point. Nurse tanks are used to move NH3 from distribution 
centers to farm fields by towing them behind trucks or tractors; once in the 
field the NH3 is injected into the soil. Tank failures can release the stored 
NH3 with explosive force, posing the additional risk of impact injury to 
workers and bystanders. This book presents findings of causes for stress 
corrosion cracks (SCC), pinhole leaks, fatigue cracks, and other flaws in 
nurse tanks. It presents possible inspection strategies for non-destructively 
identifying such flaws in nurse tanks that are used to transport anhydrous 
ammonia (NH3) over both public roadways and farm fields. It also presents 
prediction methods that can be used to estimate the safe operating life of a 
nurse tank that contains cracks of varying sizes. Historically nurse tanks 
held 1,000 or 1,500 gallons (3800 liters or 5500 liters) ofNH3, but in recent 
years dual- and even tri-mounted 3,000-gallon ( 11,000-liter) tanks are 
being used by some large farms. Many of the reportedly 200,000 nurse 
tanks in use in the United States are three to five decades old. Several 
failures have caused extensive property damage, serious injuries, and death. 
This research further confirms that SCC is the greatest threat to nurse tank 
integrity. 
This research study addressed this nurse tank safety issue in several ways, 
including: 
• Purchase and examination of 20 used nurse tanks by metallography, 
glow discharge spectroscopy, neutron diffraction analysis of residual 
stresses, as well as ultrasound and fluorescent dye penetrant 
examinations for indications of possible cracks. 
• Exposure of 56 test sample specimens of commonly used steel to 
NH3• Steel samples were tension-stressed while immersed in liquid 
NH3 or exposed to pure NH3 vapor for 7 months to study initiation 
and growth of stress corrosion cracks. 
• Preparation of a survey of the technical literature on nurse tank 
properties and case studies of tank failures. 
• Examination of tanks containing pinhole leaks by radiography, serial 
milling, and side-angle ultrasound. These measurements indicated 
that welding surfaces contaminated by water, mill scale, rust, or 
other contaminants caused weld porosity that caused greatly 
accelerated metal fatigue of remaining non-porous wall thicknesses, 
which rapidly led to complete tank wall penetration, causing slow 
leakage ofNH3• 
• Measurement of stress corrosion crack (SCC) growth rates in three 
different ammonia solutions. These tests showed that neither 
nitrogen purging of a tank's vapor space during filling nor adding N-
Serve (2-chloro-6-trichloromethyl pyridine) to ammonia changed 
crack growth rates . 
• Neutron diffraction analysis on a nurse tank given an American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) protocol post-weld heat 
treatment (PWHT) lowered residual hoop stress near welds by two-
thirds and lowered residual axial stress near welds by one-third. 
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Since residual stress drives initiation and propagation of stress 
corrosion cracking, these findings suggest that sec should be 
greatly reduced by PWHT in tank manufacture. 
Side-angle ultrasound measurements of welds in 532 in-service nurse 
tanks showed that 40 percent of the tanks had no observable cracks, 
and the remaining 60 percent of tanks contained a total of3,326 
indications. Cracks are most common in tank heads near the 
circumferential welds in the vapor space near the tanks ' tops. Newer 
tanks manufactured using thinner steel have substantially more 
indications, and tanks with greater porosity in their welds appear to 
have more indications. 
The project was divided into two phases. Phase 1 performed the first three 
bulleted items described above during the period 2008-2011 , and Phase II 
addressed the last four items described above during 2011-2013. This 
document reports the findings and recommendations for best inspection 
practices to reduce risks associated with nurse tank failures. This report 
may interest nurse tank owners, manufacturers, tank repair businesses, and 
farmers using nurse tanks to fertilize their crops, as well as all other parties 
concerned with public roadway safety. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Anhydrous ammonia (NH3) is widely used as a fertilizer for crops needing 
nitrogen soil supplements. It is locally distributed from agriculture 
cooperatives to farm fields via nurse tanks. Nurse tanks are cylindrical steel 
tank shells with hemispherical or elliptical end caps referred to as heads , 
designed to hold NH3 in liquid form under pressure. Typical steels that 
have been used to construct nurse tanks include ASTM A285, ASTM 
A455, and ASTM A516 grade 70. (ASTM is formerly known as the 
American Society for Testing and Materials.) The lower-strength, low-
carbon A455 is now more common. The 56 coupons tested in NH3 by this 
study used A455 steel. However, the data calculations in Appendix A for 
minimum critical crack sizes are based on the very similar A5 l 6 grade 70 
steel. The 455 and 516 grade 70 steels are quite similar in composition, 
mechanical properties, and corrosion behavior. Thus, we believe the 
Appendix A calculations are representative of the A455 steel. 
In the 1960s, a quenched and tempered ASTM A5 l 7 grade F higher-
strength steel was used to construct nurse tanks and is still used today in 
NH3 tank trailers subject to U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) 
motor carrier (MC) MC-331 requirements for high-pressure vessels . Data 
on SCC of this steel is reported in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix E. ASTM 
A517 Grade F has significantly lower carbon content and higher chromium, 
molybdenum, and nickel contents that could make its sec behavior differ 
from that of A455 and A516 steels. However, the general finding of what 
causes SCC, reported in Appendix E, still holds. 
The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) previously estimated that about 200,000 nurse 
tanks are in operation across the United States, many of which are 3 to 5 
decades old. An international survey conducted in 1982 found that more 
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than half of all inspected spherical NH3 tanks were reported to have 
cracks.OJ The Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance 
branch of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported 
NH3 as the number one released hazardous substance in 1997.<2l 
Liquefied NH3 flash vaporizes upon depressurization and causes severe 
freeze bums when in contact with human tissue. NH3 is also very caustic 
and most severely affects the high-moisture-bearing eye, skin, 
gastrointestinal, and respiratory systems. Exposure to greater than 140 parts 
per million (ppm) ofNH3 can cause corneal ulcerations, iritis (swelling and 
irritation of the uvea, the middle layer of the eye, which provides most of 
the blood supply to the retina), cataracts, glaucoma, and retinal atrophy. An 
article in the publication "The Nurse Practitioner" says that exposure to 
1,700 ppm (1/6 of 1 percent) of NH3 can result in permanent respiratory 
damage. <3> In the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report on 
the Calamus, Iowa, anhydrous ammonia incident, NTSB recommended a 
rulemaking to require non-destructive testing of all nurse tanks. That 
report also states that according to the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH), the "low lethal" concentration (LCLO) of 
anhydrous ammonia for humans is 5,000 ppm (112 of I percent) for a period 
of 5 minutes. 02l Therefore, the safe storage of NH3 in nurse tanks is of 
great concern to anyone dealing with its handling or transportation. 
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Nurse tanks can fail from cracks for several reasons: 
• There can be a flaw in the manufacture (e.g. , a weld is not properly 
executed). 
• The tank can be damaged in use (e.g., dented by an impact). 
• The tank can spontaneously initiate and grow small existing cracks 
due to the high residual stresses, high operational stresses in the tank, 
and corrosiveness of the NH3 solution. This initiation of and growth 
of cracks is commonly referred to as sec. 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code for some 
time has provided the nurse tank manufacturer a choice regarding what 
level ofradiography to use to inspect welded joints on the tanks. If they use 
100-percent radiography on the longitudinal seam, then they can meet the 
minimum safety requirements using thinner steel for the shell wall than if 
they do not perform a 100-percent radiograph of the longitudinal weld 
seam. According to 49 CFR 171.7 the finished tank is then supposed to be 
subject to a hydrostatic acceptance test at 1.5 times the maximum working 
pressure of 250 pounds per square inch (1700 kPa), or 375 pounds per 
square inch (2600 kPa). 
At one of the manufacturers of nurse tanks, radiography equipment was 
developed (in the late l 980's) that practically allows I 00-percent 
radiography of the longitudinal seam in a production line environment. The 
result of that development, together with the safety design provisions of the 
code, has led both the remaining U.S. manufacturers of nurse tanks to make 
the business decision to use 100-percent radiography of the longitudinal 
seam, and thus take advantage of the ASME specification for thinner steel 
for the shell. 
The amount of radiography used in inspecting the longitudinal weld seam 
during manufacture is recorded on the nurse tank's data plate. Thus, owners 
and inspectors of nurse tanks can easily distinguish which tanks received a 
100-percent radiograph of the longitudinal seam as part of their 
manufacture. 
Head-to-shell welds continue to be spot x-rayed at one 6-inch length of 
weld for every 50 feet of weld. This means it is possible for the head seams 
on a given tank to have no spot x-ray applied. Because head-to-shell welds 
are not 100-percent x-ray inspected, a variety of crack-like flaws can exist 
in these welds, even in new tanks. These cracks can be encouraged to grow 
by operational stresses and SCC. The same is true for welds that join two or 
more shell sections together. Unlike the head welds , which are welded only 
from the outside, the welds joining shell sections together are performed 
from both the inside and outside. 
The same is also true for cracks around welds that attach the running gear 
feet to the tank body. ASME offers a number of examples of guidance for 
how running gear feet may be attached to the tank shell, but none 
constitutes a specification. Running gear feet failures generally cannot be 
attributed to SCC, because the NH3 is on the inside of the tank, which does 
not reach the leg feet mount welds. However, because these are unannealed 
welds, there is the possibility of creating a higher stress heat-affected zone 
(HAZ) through the steel, making the inner surface where the running gear 
feet are attached more susceptible to SCC. However, failures around these 
welds seem more likely to be metal fatigue related from the repeated 
stresses placed on the tank shell through repeated transient stresses 
associated with traversing rough terrain. 
There are visual inspection standards applied to dents in nurse tanks 
without data plates. They specify the maximum dent depth, size, and ratio 
of depth to size. This visual inspection standard could be logically applied 
to all tanks if the decision is made to require all nurse tanks to be 
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periodically inspected, as recommended by the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB). 
There is also an inspection standard found at 49 CFR 173 .3 l 5(m)(2) for 
hydrostatically testing nurse tanks without data plates at 375 psi. This too 
could be applied to all nurse tanks. TFI petitioned the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for adoption of such 
a standard. The specification found at 49 CFR l 73.315(m)(2), "Nurse tanks 
with missing or illegible ASME plates," says: 
Nurse tanks with missing or illegible ASME plates may 
continue to be operated provided they conform to the 
following requirements: 
(i) Each nurse tank must undergo an external visual 
inspection and testing m accordance with 
§180.407(d) ofthis subchapter. 
(ii) Each nurse tank must be thickness tested in 
accordance with § l 80.407(i) of this subchapter. A 
nurse tank with a capacity of less than 1,500 gallons 
must have a minimum head thickness of 0.203 inch 
and a minimum shell thickness of 0.239 inch. A 
nurse tank with a capacity of 1,500 gallons or more 
must have a minimum thickness of 0.250 inch. Any 
nurse tank with a thickness test reading of less than 
that specified in this paragraph at any point must be 
removed from hazardous materials service. 
(iii) Each nurse tank must be pressure tested in 
accordance with § l 80.407(g) of this subchapter. The 
minimum test pressure is 375 pounds per square inch 
gauge (psig). Pneumatic testing is not authorized. 
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(iv) Each nurse tank must be inspected and tested by a 
person meeting the requirements of § 180.409( d) of 
this subchapter. Furthermore, each nurse tank must 
have the tests performed at least once every 5 years 
after the completion of the initial tests. 
(v) After each nurse tank has successfully passed the 
visual, thickness, and pressure tests, welded repairs 
on the tank are prohibited. 
(vi) After the nurse tank has successfully passed the 
visual, thickness, and pressure tests, it must be 
marked in accordance with § 180.4 l 5(b ), and 
permanently marked near the test and inspection 
markings with a unique owner's identification 
number in letters and numbers at leastl /2 inch in 
height and width. 
(vii) Each nurse tank owner must maintain a copy of the 
test inspection report prepared by the inspector. The 
test report must contain the results of the test and 
meet the requirements in § 180.4 l 7(b) and be made 
available to a DOT representative upon request. 
Note. The current hazmat regulation at 49 CFR 171. 7 incorporates the 1998 
ASME specification for hydrostatic testing by the manufacturer at 1.5 times 
the maximum allowable working pressure of 250 psig, or 375 psig, as a 
final quality control check after the tank is fabricated at the manufacturing 
facility. (PSIG is generally interpreted to mean the same as PSI. It 
specifically means the internal pressure minus the external atmospheric 
pressure, i.e., the difference in pressures.) 
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ASME has issued an update to the 1998 code that lowered the initial 
manufacturer's quality control or acceptance pressure testing to 325 psi . 
FMCSA reports the remaining two U.S. nurse tank manufactures have 
adopted the newer ASME specification of 325 psi for initial acceptance 
testing. The existing PHMSA regulation at 49 CFR 171.7 still references 
the 1998 ASME specification that requires 375 psi hydrostatic initial 
manufacturer acceptance testing. The more recent PHMSA regulation at 49 
CFR 173.315(m)(2) also specifies hydrostatic testing at 375 psi for tanks 
with missing or illegible data plates. 
PRIOR STUDIES OF STRESS CORROSION 
CRACKING IN NURSE TANKS 
Most studies of NH3 SCC were performed in the 1960s and 1980s. Current 
literature on the topic is scarce, suggesting the need for further 
investigation of the structural integrity of aging nurse tanks. Different steels 
and manufacturing quality control methods were employed over the years 
by multiple companies. The number of U.S. nurse tank manufacturers is 
now reduced to two. 
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) 
sec results from a process that simultaneously involves a corrosive 
environment and tensile stress on the steel from residual and/or applied 
tensile stresses. The extent to which SCC damages a material is determined 
by the material type, environment, and amount of tensile stress. sec can be 
classified according to three broad categories: active path dissolution, 
hydrogen embrittlement, and film-induced cleavage. 
Active Path Dissolution 
Active path dissolution occurs in active metals that have passive protective 
layers. Accelerated corrosion occurs along crack tips, grain boundaries, or 
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other paths of high corrosion susceptibility where the passive protective 
layer is compromised.<4J When a metal is surrounded by a corrosive 
solution (e.g., NH3) and a tensile stress is applied, the stress serves to open 
up small cracks in the protective layer. The crack tips act as stress risers 
and provide a pathway for accelerated corrosion (dissolution of the active 
metal). Thus, the combined effect of corrosive solution and stress serve as 
an "electrochemical knife" that slices through the metai.<5l The speed of 
active path dissolution is limited by the rate of corrosion that can occur at 
the crack tip. Thus, cracks in steel used for nurse tanks generally grow at 
rates of less than l millimeter (mm) per year.(4J 
Hydrogen Embrittlement 
Hydrogen embrittlement is the process by which various metals, most 
importantly high-strength steel, become brittle and fracture following 
exposure to hydrogen in environments that facilitate its infusion into the 
metal. Thus, hydrogen embrittlement may have been a larger problem in 
the past when nurse tanks were made out of high-strength steels. 
Hydrogen embrittlement occurs when a source of hydrogen is present in a 
metal's environment, which is true in nurse tanks containing both NH3 and 
0.2 percent water. Hydrogen can damage nearly all metals by filling 
interstitial sites associated with the cracks (these are the spaces between the 
atoms and the grains of the metal), which causes the metal to become more 
brittle. Because of their small size, hydrogen atoms can diffuse into metals 
very quickly. Furthermore, hydrogen easily diffuses into regions ahead of 
crack tips due to local stresses and lattice dilations (stretching of the 
spacing between the metal atoms by the tensile stress). (4) 
Film-induced Cleavage 
Film-induced cleavage occurs in ductile materials that form brittle films in 
the presence of a corrosive substance. When stresses crack open the brittle 
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outer protective layer, the active ductile material underneath blunts the 
crack tip. The film reforms, and the process repeats, causing the metal to 
continually corrode away.<4) 
Mechanisms of Anhydrous Ammonia Stress Corrosion 
Cracking in Steel 
Wilde concluded that hydrogen embrittlement does not contribute to NH3 
SCC, and that NH3 SCC in steel is of the active path dissolution type .<6i 
Thus, film-induced cleavage is also eliminated as the mechanism by which 
SCC advances. However, not all investigators agree with Wilde's 
conclusions (see Appendix E). 
Both intergranular and transgranular cracking occur as the result of NH3 
sec: 
• Intergranular is a crack that runs through a metal by following a path 
along grain boundaries. Grain boundaries are individual crystals of 
metal. A typical piece of metal contains thousands or even millions 
of very small grains. A grain boundary is the place where one grain 
ends and a new grain begins. This could be thought of as somewhat 
like a person who travels across a State by driving only on county-
line roads. 
• Transgranular is a crack that runs through the grains of a metal and 
does not follow a path along grain boundaries. It could be thought of 
as somewhat like a person who travels across a State ignoring 
county-line roads and driving a four-wheel-drive vehicle across field 
and stream. 
Pure NH3 does not cause SCC. But when NH3 is mixed with as little as 0.5 
ppm oxygen, it does cause SCC. Adding 0.1 percent water by weight to 
NH3 was shown to inhibit SCC completely in such ammonia solutions. 
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Thus, oxygen serves two roles in NH3 SCC; it forms protective oxide layers 
on metal, but when those layers are cracked or broken, it acts as the 
oxidizing agent to cause corrosion. 
However, the inhibition of corrosion by the addition of water to NH3 only 
works in the portion of the tank where the ammonia solution is in the liquid 
phase that contains the water. Since ammonia has a much higher vapor 
pressure than water, the vapor area of the tank does not contain the 
necessary water to inhibit the SCC caused by the NH3. 
Lunde and Nyborg demonstrated that the addition of water to liquid NH3 
does not provide protection against sec in regions of the tank above the 
liquid level because vaporized NH3 (free of the added water) can condense 
on the upper surfaces of the tank.°l Oxygen dissolved in NH3 increases the 
corrosion potential of steel, while dissolved nitrogen has little effect on the 
polarization potential. 
Though nitrogen has no electrochemical effect, it accelerates SCC when in 
the presence of oxygen.<8•9l Only oxygen and oxygen-nitrogen 
contaminations of ammonia have been shown to cause SCC. Though 
carbon dioxide (C02) has been shown to be generally corrosive, it does not 
appear to contribute to NH3 scc.<6l 
Several theories have developed to explain the process of NH3 SCC. A 
film-rupture model was proposed by Wilde based upon electrochemical 
studies, and it proceeds as follows. Steel in NH3 exists in both a film-free 
active state, and a covered passive state formed by dissolved oxygen. The 
oxygen forms a noble adsorbed film on all steel surfaces (adhering to the 
surface but not penetrating beneath the surface). When the steel is stressed 
enough to create plastic deformation at slip steps, the protective oxygen 
film rendering the steel passive is ruptured at that point. Direct galvanic 
coupling between the bare steel at the slip step and the still intact portion of 
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the adsorbed oxygen film causes anodic dissolution of the steel until the 
oxygen film reforms. 
Nitrogen is proposed to compete with oxygen to adsorb to the steel, but 
without forming a protective film itself, thus hindering repassivation of the 
exposed steel with an oxygen film. When the passive protective oxygen 
film is ruptured by an applied stress, nitrogen adsorbs in place of oxygen 
and anodic dissolution is allowed to continue for a much longer time. In the 
absence of dissolved nitrogen, the oxygen film passivating the steel quickly 
recovers and crack growth is slow. The nitrogen-oxygen combination 
causes more rapid dissolution of steel and thus more severe cracking. A 
regular source of free N2 nitrogen introduction occurs when air enters the 
tank as part of hydrostatic pressure tests. A tank interior completely devoid 
of oxygen gas would not passivate well, but would also lack the oxygen 
needed to drive SCC; thus, purging tanks with nitrogen after exposing the 
inner surface to air has been suggested as an effective step to reduce sec 
damage in nurse tanks. 
Water also has an affinity for adsorption (adhering to the surface but not 
penetrating beneath the surface) on steel since it is a polar molecule, and it 
acts as an additional passive film, thus aiding oxygen in slowing sec, thus , 
the value of adding water to the NH3. 
EXAMPLES OF CATASTROPHIC FAILURE CAUSED 
BY STRESS CORROSION CRACKING 
In 1956, Dawson reported that 3 percent of anhydrous nurse tanks (possibly 
being used for cotton) failed within 3 years of service in a southern State 
that has a large number of such vessels .0 0) Revised ASME specifications 
were put in place for future tanks manufactured, but failures continued to 
occur. Fuller versions of the following summaries are contained in 
Appendix E. 
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Calamus, Iowa Incident 
In the spring of 2003, a cooperative worker in Calamus, Iowa, was killed 
when the nurse tank he and another man were filling ruptured. The 
catastrophic rupture of NH3 gas threw one man against a truck, knocking 
him unconscious. A coworker who pulled him to safety inhaled NH3 gas at 
a sufficient concentration (presumably between 1,700-1 /6 of 1 percent-
and 5,000 ppm 1/2 of 1 percent) that caused him to eventually die of 
pneumonia due to inhalation bums in his lungs. 
After the accident, a detailed investigation was performed by the NTSB. 
The tank was constructed of 3/8-inch SA-455 steel in 1976 and was 
designed to withstand 250 psig as specified by the ASME Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Code: Section VIII, "Rules for Construction of Pressure 
Vessels. " Furthermore, the tank was hydrostatically pressure tested by the 
manufacturer at the then-specified 375 psig after manufacture. About 27 
years after construction, the nurse tank ruptured along the tank's 
longitudinal weld seam that ran along the bottom of the tank for 53.5 
inches (see Appendix E, Figure 86, for a photo ).< 11 ) 
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the sudden failure of the 
nurse tank was inadequate welding and insufficient radiographic inspection 
during the tank's manufacture, as well as lack of periodic inspection testing 
during the tank's service life to detect deterioration of the inadequate weld. 
They recommended in their 2003 report that a 100-percent radioscopic 
inspection of longitudinal welds should be required in place of spot 
radiography.<12l 
Current ASME specifications still allow using only spot checks. But, it also 
provides an incentive for using a 100-percent radioscopic check of the 
shell's longitudinal weld seam. Namely, if JOO-percent radioscopic 
inspection is completed, then it allows for use of slightly thinner steel for 
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the tank shel!Y3l Both existing U.S. manufacturers have adopted using a 
100-percent radiograph of the longitudinal welded seam and the thinner 
steel for the tank shell. 
Morris, Minnesota Incident 
On June 6, 2005, at approximately 6 p.m. , a 1,000-gallon NH3 tank 
catastrophically ruptured in Morris, Minnesota, at the Cenex Cooperative 
site. The tank had been filled to the recommended maximum of 85 percent 
capacity 3 hours before it ruptured. When the tank ruptured, a portion of 
the rear head blew off, releasing the entire contents of more than 841 
gallons of NH3• The nurse tank shot 100 yards across the lot, split a utility 
tractor in half, and hit a parked automobile before coming to rest. The 
tank's path missed other filled nurse tanks by only 25 yards. Since the 
rupture happened in the evening, no employees were in the area, and no 
workers were injured or killed. However, a farmer living three-tenths of a 
mile to the west of the Cenex Coop was hospitalized for NH3 inhalation 
treatment. The tank was coined the "Morris Missile" because of its ballistic 
nature (see Appendix E for a photo).<13l 
Silver Lake, Minnesota Explosion 
On December 21, 2007, the rear-facing head of a 1,000-gallon nurse tank, 
towed by a farmer with his pickup truck, catastrophically ruptured. The 
tank tore away from its running gear, slammed into the back of the truck, 
and then shot across the fanner's front yard. The NH3 in the tank 
vaporized, and the farmer was hospitalized for NH 3 exposure. Packer 
Engineering performed an investigation of the accident for the US DOT. 
The tank was constructed in 1973 by Chemi-Trol Chemical Co. in Ohio. 
The ASME nameplate information indicated that upon manufacture, like all 
such welds , the tank' s head to shell weld was spot-inspected by 
radiography, but additionally the welds had been stress-relieved (annealed) . 
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Visual examination of the head revealed that the crack originated on the 
inside diameter of the rear head at a region that had previously been 
damaged by an impact with some other object. 
This is critical, because significant dents create considerable local stresses 
in the steel, which can facilitate the initiation of a crack. This is why the 
visual inspection standard for nurse tanks without data plates specifies the 
maximum allowed size and depth for dents . Metallographic examination of 
the crack initiation site revealed that severe crack branching, as well as 
intergranular and transgranular brittle fracturing had occurred because of 
the dent damage, and thus the induced stress. The cause of the accident was 
reported as rupture due to sec, accelerated by residual stresses induced 
from the dent (see Appendix E, Figure 92, for a photo). (t4) 
Middleton, Ohio Tanker Accident 
On August 22, 2003, a USDOT MC 331 cargo tank head ruptured while the 
tank was being filled with NH3 in Middleton, Ohio. The tank was 
manufactured in 1977 of ASTM A516 grade 70 quenched and tempered 
steel. It had a nominal shell thickness of 0.399 inches, minimum head 
thickness of 0.250 inches, and maximum allowable working pressure of 
265 psig at 150° F. The tank's capacity was 10,600 gallons. The head 
failure occurred when the tanker was about half-full ofNH3 at 80° F, with 
an internal pressure of 170 psig. The release ofNH3 caused the evacuation 
of 100 employees from buildings downwind of the tank. Five people 
received medical treatment for inhalation injuries, but no one was seriously 
hurt. The damage from the tank rupture caused an estimated $25,000 in 
damages to equipment. 
Before the accident, the tank had been inspected externally with magnetic 
particle testing and internally with hydrostatic testing in March 2002. It had 
received the annual external visual inspection in 2003 in accordance with 
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USDOT mandates. An NTSB investigation into the accident revealed that a 
16-inch through-wall crack next to a radial weld on the head had 
developed. Post-mortem magnetic particle inspection revealed cracks along 
other radial head welds that had not yet penetrated completely through the 
wall. 
When investigators opened up the 16-inch through-wall crack for 
examination with a scanning electron microscope (SEM), a previously 
undetected 3-inch through-wall crack opened up as well. Both through-wall 
cracks exhibited intergranular corrosion and separation (see Appendix E, 
Figure 98, for photo). 
Investigation into the NH3 filling process revealed that the required amount 
of water needed to prevent SCC was not being added to the liquid NH3, 
even though the tanker company handbook stated that 0.2 percent water by 
weight must be added to NH3 carried in its liquid petroleum gas (LPG) 
tanks. When it ruptured, the NH3 being pumped into the tanker contained 
less than 0.1 percent water. The reported cause of the failure was SCC, 
which presumably developed because company practices were not 
established to explicitly prohibit quenched and tempered high-strength steel 
tankers from carrying NH3 with less than 0.2 percent water .< 15> 
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